Andrew Sweeting
Full Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland
Published Papers (with links to accepted versions or JSTOR)
"Coordination, Differentiation and the Timing of Radio Commercials", Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15(4), 2006
"Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995-2000", The Economic Journal, 117(520), 2007
"The Strategic Timing of Radio Commercials: An Empirical Analysis Using Multiple Equilibria", RAND Journal of Economics, 40(4), 2009
"The Effects of Mergers on Product Positioning: Evidence from the Music Radio Industry", RAND Journal of Economics, 41(2), 2010
Earlier Versions (with some additional results): Too Much Rock and Roll Music Variety, Station Listenership, ...
"Price Dynamics in Perishable Goods Markets: The Case of Secondary Markets for Major League Baseball Tickets", Journal of Political Economy, 120(6), 2012
"When Should Sellers Use Auctions?", American Economic Review, 103(5), 2013, with James Roberts
Linked to Published Version (with minor changes)
"Dynamic Product Positioning in Differentiated Product Industries: The Effect of Fees for Musical Performance Rights on the Commercial Radio Industry", Econometrica, 81(5), 2013
Link to code and materials
"Regulating Bidder Participation in Auctions", RAND Journal of Economics 45(4), 2014, with Vivek Bhattacharya and James Roberts
"Multiplicity of Equilibria and Information Structures in Empirical Games: Challenges and Prospects", Marketing Letters, 2014, with multiple co-authors (Brett Gordon, Paul Ellickson and Ron Borkovsky were the principal organizers)
"Selective Entry and Auction Design", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 43, 2015, with Vivek Bhattacharya
"Radio", Chapter in the Handbook of Media Economics (Elsevier), ed., Simon Anderson, Joel Waldfogel and David Strömberg, 2015
"Bailouts and the Preservation of Competition", forthcoming at the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015, with James Roberts
Earlier versions (without the bailout application): Competition versus Auction Design